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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this diversity action alleging breach of a commercial 
property lease under Pennsylvania law, appellants Joseph 
and Julia Y. Huang (collectively, the "Huangs" or "Lessor") 
appeal an order by the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania ("the District Court") 
granting summary judgment in favor of appellee BP Amoco 
Corporation ("BP Amoco"), the successor in interest of 
Amoco Oil Company ("Amoco" or "Lessee"). We conclude 
that by making the unsupported factual assumption that 
Amoco could not apply for contractually required 
Government approvals until it procured satisfactory 
agreements with third-party co-developers, the District 
Court unjustifiably allowed BP Amoco to flout its implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
 
On September 21, 1998, Amoco by written agreement 
("the Lease") leased a commercial property in Philadelphia 
from the Huangs for fifteen years. The Lease allowed Amoco 
to make improvements to the property for the purpose of 
operating a "retail gasoline facility" or"for any [other] lawful 
purpose." Under section 2 of the Lease, no rent was due 
until Amoco sold gasoline from the property. 
 
The crucial provisions for our purposes are in 
subsections 7(b) and 7(c), and S 19, of the Lease. 
Subsection 7(b) gave Amoco 180 days to obtain "approvals" 
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from various government authorities for any improvements 
to the property, subject to thirty-day extensions at the 
Huangs' option: 
 
       Lessee shall apply for appropriate zoning and for 
       issuance from the proper municipal, county, state and 
       other duly constituted authorities such unconditional 
       Approvals and permits . . . (collectively "the Approvals") 
       satisfactory to Lessee, in its sole discretion, for the 
       razing of improvements, construction of improvements 
       and installation of equipment for a retail gasoline 
       facility and for the operation and maintenance of such 
       facility. . . . Lessee shall not be deemed to be in default 
       of any provision relating to the Approvals as long as the 
       pursuit of the administrative, legal or equitable 
       proceedings shall be diligently carried out by Lessee. 
       . . . 
 
       It is agreed by Lessee that it shall obtain the 
       Approvals, or denial, within 180 days of the full 
       execution of the Lease. In the event the Approvals, or 
       denial, are not received by Lessee within the 180 days, 
       Lessor shall have the option, at his sole discretion, of 
       extending the period for an additional thirty (30) days, 
       and granting additional thirty (30) day periods 
       thereafter until the Approvals or denial are received, or 
       canceling this Lease. 
 
Section 19 reiterated that Amoco was required to obtain the 
Approvals: "In reliance on Lessor's representations, 
warranties and covenants set forth herein, Lessee will 
obligate itself to expend sums to, without limitation, . . . 
obtain the Approvals." 
 
Subsection 7(c)1 listed situations in which Amoco could 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Subsection 7(c) reads in full: 
 
       In the event Lessee shall be unable to obtain the Approvals, or any 
       thereof; or in the event the Approvals, or any thereof, if 
obtained, 
       shall be afterward revoked without fault of Lessee, or its assignee 
or 
       sublessee; or in the event Lessee shall be unable to enter into an 
       agreement satisfactory to Lessee, in its sole discretion, for the 
co- 
       development with a third party quick-service restaurant and 
       satisfying all conditions and contingencies in that agreement; or 
in 
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terminate the Lease without incurring liability. Three of 
these situations are relevant here. First, it could terminate 
the Lease if one of the required Approvals were denied. 
Second, Amoco could terminate the Lease if it were"unable 
to enter into an agreement satisfactory to Lessee, in its sole 
discretion, for the co-development with a third party quick- 
service restaurant. . . ." Third, "[i]f for any reason [Amoco] 
has not obtained the Approvals within six (6) months after 
the date of execution of this Lease by both Lessor and 
Lessee, then Lessee may, at Lessee's discretion, terminate 
this Lease as though the Approvals, of any thereof, had 
been denied." 
 
Six months after signing the Lease, BP Amoco had made 
no efforts to obtain the required Approvals. On March 19, 
1999, BP Amoco and the Huangs agreed to extend the 180- 
day period for obtaining Approvals to April 20, 1999. On 
April 19, 1999, still having made no effort to obtain any 
Approvals, BP Amoco sent a letter to the Huangs stating 
that it "has not obtained the Approvals required by Section 
7 . . . within the prescribed 180-day period as extended to 
April 20, 1999," and "[a]ccordingly, pursuant to Section 7(c) 
. . . hereby exercises its privilege of terminating[the Lease]." 
On neither March 19 nor April 19 did BP Amoco claim that 
its ability to seek the Approvals was contingent upon its 
procuring satisfactory third-party co-developer agreements. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       the event necessary utility connections (including but not limited 
to 
       electricity, natural gas, sanitary and storm sewer, telephone and 
       water hookups) adequate in Lessee's sole judgment are unavailable 
       at the property line or in the adjoining right-of-way to serve the 
       Demised Premises for a standard "tap-on" fee; or if Lessee, its 
       assignee or sublessee shall be restrained or enjoined from 
       conducting its business and maintaining its improvements, 
       driveways and equipment; then and in any or either of such events, 
       Lessee shall have the privilege of terminating this Lease by giving 
       Lessor ten (10) days' notice of its intention so to do, and shall 
       thereupon be relieved of all liability hereunder. If for any reason 
       Lessee has not obtained the Approvals within six (6) months after 
       the date of execution of this Lease by both Lessor and Lessee, then 
       Lessee may, at Lessee's discretion, terminate this Lease as though 
       the Approvals, or any thereof, had been denied. 
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Indeed, on neither occasion did BP Amoco even mention its 
inability to reach such agreements. 
 
After BP Amoco announced that it was terminating the 
Lease despite occupying the property rent-free for seven 
months, the Huangs brought suit in the District Court and 
filed a motion for summary judgment. BP Amoco responded 
with a cross-motion for summary judgment, and the 
District Court entered summary judgment for it. The 
District Court found that subsection 7(c), "in clear and 
unambiguous terms, allowed [BP Amoco] to terminate the 
contract" in two situations: "if [BP Amoco] failed to reach 
any agreements, suitable to [BP Amoco] in its sole 
discretion, with third parties regarding the development of 
the property" or "if, for any reason, [BP Amoco] failed to 
obtain [the required] Approvals within six months of 
executing the contract." Huang v. BP Amoco Corp., No. 00- 
1290, slip op. at 1, 7 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2000). 
 
The District Court recognized that despite subsection 
7(c)'s "clear and unambiguous terms," BP Amoco was--like 
any party to a contract--"bound by an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing." Id. at 8. But reasoning that 
"common sense dictates that [BP Amoco] would not have 
been required to apply for zoning permits, variances, or 
other Approvals until [it] had determined with specificity 
how it would develop and operate the property," the District 
Court found that "any obligation on [BP Amoco] to pursue 
Approvals was contingent upon [its] success on procuring 
satisfactory agreements [with] third-party co-developers." 
Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
 
In other words, the District Court found, based on its 
"common sense" assumption, that BP Amoco's duty to act 
in good faith did not include a responsibility to seek and 
obtain the Approvals until it first reached acceptable 
agreements with third-party co-developers. Because BP 
Amoco "made earnest [though unsuccessful] efforts to 
negotiate and reach suitable agreements with third parties," 
it satisfied its covenant to act in good faith. Id. at 9. 
Therefore, the District Court concluded, BP Amoco 
could--as its April 19, 1999, letter did--terminate the Lease 
without ever trying to obtain the Approvals. Id.  
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Following the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment to BP Amoco, the Huangs filed a motion for 
reconsideration. The District Court denied the Huangs' 
motion, again insisting that BP Amoco could not seek 
Approvals without first reaching agreements with third- 
party co-developers, Huang v. BP Amoco Corp., No. 00- 
1290, slip op. at 1, 4 (E.D. Pa. October 12, 2000), and this 
appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 
II. Legal Analysis 
 
We review the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo. Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 
777 (3d Cir. 1994). Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that a moving party is entitled to 
summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The 
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the 
absence of any genuine issue of material fact, though the 
non-moving party must make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of each element of his case on which 
he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The standard for 
granting summary judgment under Rule 56 "mirrors the 
standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a 
verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one 
reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). 
 
Pennsylvania contract law informs our analysis of the 
District Court's entry of summary judgment. In 
Pennsylvania, a lease is a contract and "is to be interpreted 
according to contract principles." Hutchinson v. Sunbeam 
Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 389 (Pa. 1986). One of the most 
important principles of contract law is the implied covenant 
of good faith. "[S]uch a promise is fairly to be implied. The 
law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the 
precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was 
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fatal." Jamison v. Concepts Plus, Inc., 552 A.2d 265, 269 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff- 
Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.)). Hence 
"where it is clear that an obligation is within the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting or is 
necessary to carry out their intentions, the court will imply 
it . . . even where the contract itself is not ambiguous." 
Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 546 A.2d 676, 679 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1988). 
 
Because of the implied covenant of good faith, an 
approvals contingency clause does not give a lessee an 
absolute right to terminate the lease without penalty. 
Rather, the lessee must make a diligent and good-faith 
effort to obtain the required approvals. Jamison , 552 A.2d 
at 269.2 Under Pennsylvania law, whether a party has made 
a good-faith effort is a question of fact. Id.  at 270 (citing 
Burke v. Gen. Outdoor Adver. Co., 168 A. 334, 336 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1933)); Pressey v. McCornack, 84 A. 427, 428 
(Pa. 1912); In re J.B. Van Sciver Co., 73 B.R. 838, 845 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
 
In light of these principles, the District Court made an 
unsupported factual assumption that colored its analysis. It 
assumed that BP Amoco could not seek the Approvals until 
it reached suitable agreements with third-party co- 
developers. Without this factual assumption BP Amoco 
would not have carried its initial burden of "show[ing] that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). The Huangs alleged in their complaint that BP 
Amoco "made no effort whatsoever to obtain the Approvals, 
in violation of its obligations under Section 7(b) of the 
Lease." The pleadings and documents in the record offer 
some support for the Huangs' allegation: BP Amoco failed to 
make any effort to seek the Approvals, and failed to 
state--on March 19, 1999, April 19, 1999, or at any other 
time preceding the current litigation--that it failed to do so 
because it could not reach suitable agreements with third- 
party co-developers. Only when faced with legal action did 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Indeed, "if no duty is implied or imposed upon the [lessee] in this 
situation, there is no contract" because the absence of an implied 
obligation would render the lessee's promise illusory. Id. 
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BP Amoco insist that its bad luck with co-developers was 
responsible for its purported inability to seek the Approvals. 
 
The District Court cited nothing in the record that even 
tended to disprove the Huangs' allegation, let alone 
anything so persuasive that no rational juror could find 
that BP Amoco's failure to seek the Approvals violated its 
implicit covenant to act in good faith. While BP Amoco 
presented the statement of its employee that BP Amoco 
made earnest efforts to find suitable third-party co- 
developers, that statement sheds little if any light on 
whether BP Amoco acted in good faith with respect to 
seeking the Approvals. 
 
Rather than acknowledging the Huangs' allegation on the 
factual question of BP Amoco's good faith with respect to 
the Approvals, the District Court ignored this issue by 
making an assumption on another, underlying question of 
fact: it assumed that getting a suitable co-developer was 
the horse before the cart of taking even the first step in 
obtaining the Approvals. The District Court made this 
assumption of fact based only on its own notion of 
"common sense" rather than anything in the record. 
 
Relying on this assumption enabled the District Court to 
avoid the factual question that lies at the heart of this case: 
whether BP Amoco's failure to seek the Approvals violated 
its covenant of good faith and fair dealing. By assuming 
that co-developer agreements must precede any effort to 
obtain the Approvals, the District Court effectively rewrote 
the Lease to contain a condition precedent to BP Amoco's 
obligation regarding those Approvals. In so doing, the Court 
gutted BP Amoco's good-faith obligation to seek Approvals 
and, by entering summary judgment in its favor, ran afoul 
of Rule 56(c). 
 
* * * * * 
 
Because the District Court substituted its version of 
"common sense" for that of a jury and thereby decided a 
disputed issue of material fact (from which followed its 
conclusion of law), we reverse its entry of summary 
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judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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